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ABSTRACT
Machine learning is used in myriad aspects, both in academic research and in
everyday life, including safety-critical applications such as robust robotics, cybersecurity
products, medial testing and diagnosis where a false positive or negative could have
catastrophic results. Despite the increasing prevalence of machine learning applications and
their role in critical systems we rely on daily, the security and robustness of machine learning
models is still a relatively young field of research with many open questions, particularly on
the defensive side of adversarial machine learning. Chief among these open questions is how
best to quantify a model’s attack surface against adversarial examples. Knowing how a model
will behave under attacks is critical information for personnel charged with securing critical
machine learning applications, and yet research towards such an attack surface metric is
incredibly sparse. This dissertation addressed this problem by using previous insights into
adversarial example attacks against machine learning models as well as the properties and
shortcomings of various defensive techniques to formulate a basic definition of a model’s
attack surface, one which allows its behavior under adversarial example attack to be generally
predicted. The proposed metric was then subjected to a limited validation using six models,
three Neural Networks and three Support Vector Machines (SVMs), using three datasets
consisting of random clusters of points in an x,y-coordinate plane. Models were trained
against each dataset to generate versions of the same model architecture with different attack
surfaces, and these versions were then subjected to attack through adversarial examples
generated by a Projected Gradient Descent with Line Search (PGDLS) attack, using varying
perturbation budgets for the attack to control attack strength. Model performance at each
perturbation budget was recorded and analyzed, leading to a limited validation of the metric
for the purpose of defining how a given model will behave against adversarial example
attacks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Problem
Machine learning has become ingrained in many fields of both scientific and academic
research as well as directly affecting our daily lives. Machine learning systems see application
in areas as diverse as Speech Recognition (Deng, Hinton, & Kingsbury, 2013), Cancer
prediction and prognosis (Konstantina, et al., 2015), Spam filtering (Kuchipudi, Nannapaneni,
& Liao, 2020), mineral processing (McCoy & Auret, 2019), and genetics (Libbrecht & Noble,
2015) as well as more traditional applications such as image classification (Melis, et al., 2017;
Liu, et al., 2017) and malware classification (Raff, et al., 2017).
The employment of machine learning in such varied disciplines has driven numerous
discoveries and advances in each area of which it is employed, and this has served to only
integrate machine learning more tightly into the systems that govern our everyday lives
(Alzubi, Nayyar, & Kumar, 2018; Chaudhary, et al., 2020), from systems and processes that
generate the goods we use, to the healthcare systems helping doctors diagnose and treat
diseases, even to the systems powering self-driving cars (Gyawali, et al., 2020) or detecting
and preventing malicious hackers attempting to breach a computer system (Xu, Qian, & Hu,
2017, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2020). As machine learning is involved in increasingly important
decisions and processes, the consequences of it being employed incorrectly or reaching the
“wrong” decision are only magnified.
It does not require a stretch of the imagination to imagine how a computer vision
system responsible for identifying road signage and hazards in an autonomous vehicle could
present significant safety concerns if such a system was used incorrectly. Failure in such a
situation could very easily result in the loss of human life, one of the gravest possible
consequences of system failure. Though there has been and continues to be significant
research into the various types of machine learning algorithms and studies as to how they can
be applied to various problem domains, there exists another aspect of this problem which lags
significantly behind in terms of effective techniques and practices: how to defend these
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systems from attack. An attacker is able to successfully compromise or influence a machine
learning system into making an incorrect decision can have just as catastrophic consequences
as one which functions incorrectly, and potentially even be more devastating due to the ability
of a human attacker influencing the outcome. Thus, machine learning security is arguably at
least as important as correctly employing machine learning algorithms in the first place.

Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial machine learning is described by Machado, Silva, and Goldschmidt
(2020) as an active field of research arising from the continuous arms race between attackers
and defenders of machine learning algorithms. Simply put, as researchers discover new
methods for attacking machine learning algorithms defenders attempt to devise defensive
methods to protect the models or make them more robust which then fuel additional research
into bypassing or refuting those defensive techniques.
The core principle of adversarial machine learning is the development of adversarial
examples. Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning algorithms which have been
subtly modified by an attacker to exploit the algorithm and cause it to return an “incorrect”
result. For image classification applications an adversarial example may include an image of
an object such as a school bus with the addition of “noise” to the underlying file which is
imperceptible to the human eye yet nevertheless fools the classification algorithm into
classifying the image as being of an ostrich. The generation of an adversarial example is
shown in Fig. 1, the original input being in the blue region of the graph, with the input being
perturbed until it crosses the decision boundary, the line between the blue and green regions,
and its final location marked by the “x”, firmly within the green decision region of the
classifier.
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Figure 1. Generic adversarial example. (Melis, et al., 2017)

An example of just such an attack is shown in Fig. 2. Adversarial examples in the
malware classification domain could include a malicious binary file (malware) which is subtly
altered by an attacker in ways that do not affect its overall functionality but result in a
malware classifier labeling the sample as benign instead of malicious. Machine learning
applications to malware analysis and classification through analyzing binary samples were
shown by Raff, et al. (2017), and attacks against these malware classification/analysis systems
were demonstrated directly by Raju, et al. in 2019.
An important distinction to make at this time is to distinguish adversarial examples
from Poisoning attacks, as it can be easy to confuse the two. Poisoning attacks involve an
adversary directly manipulating the training data which is used to train the model before it is
deployed. Adversarial examples on the other hand, are focused on affecting the validation
phase of the model, when it has already been appropriately trained and deployed in its
environment. Though there are techniques applicable to both poisoning and adversarial
examples, their disparate focus on distinct phases of the machine learning lifecycle means
they must be considered as separate techniques and as such, poisoning-based attacks are
outside the scope of this research.
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Figure 2. Adversarial Example Attacks in Image Classification. (Machado, Silva, & Goldschmidt,
2020)

There has been extensive research into methods for generating adversarial examples
and while random perturbations can be used to “brute-force” an attack, more tailored
approaches are available and optimal. Typically, these attack methods exploit properties
common to various machine learning algorithms applied to the problem and thus an
adversarial example which succeeds against one specific algorithm may in fact be effective
against another algorithm or a different iteration of the same algorithm which was trained on
different data (Papernot, McDaniel, & Goodfellow, 2016). Many attacks employ techniques
based on exploiting the classification algorithm’s gradient, how the various aspects of the
input affect the final classification decision, with arguably the most common such techniques
being the Fast-Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Tramer, et al., 2020) and Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) (Biggio, et al., (2013); Melis, et al., (2017); Demontis, et al., (2017)).
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The defensive aspect of adversarial machine learning is ripe with nearly as many
defensive techniques as there are unique types of attacks. Unfortunately, however these
defensive techniques are often developed ad-hoc to respond to a specific attack type and
recent research by Tramer, et al. (2020) and He, et al. (2017) among others, have shown that
these defensive techniques often fail altogether or are relatively trivial to bypass for an
attacker, both when deployed singularly and as an ensemble approach to defense.
Furthermore, the problem is exacerbated by the lack of research and definition of common
defensive metrics such as a model’s attack surface, which exacerbates the problem of
developing defensive techniques since there is not yet a clear definition of what exactly
defines how vulnerable a given machine learning algorithm is to attack via adversarial
examples nor of how to measure any attack surface.

Statement of the problem
The problem this research attempted to address is the lack of a definition and method
of measuring the attack surface of a machine learning algorithm against adversarial examples.
Definition and validation of such an attack surface metric would lay the groundwork for
additional focus on what components of a machine learning model are model affects its
overall vulnerability to adversarial examples and enable a more holistic approach to defensive
techniques rather than the current ad-hoc approach of attempting to defend against each new
attack type discovered. Additionally, focusing on the actual attack surface of a model may
yield more effective defenses which are less easily bypassed by a determined attacker due to
addressing the root cause of vulnerability rather than the specific mechanism being exploited
by a given attack.

Objectives of the project
The objectives of this dissertation were:
•

Develop a model-agnostic, intuitive, theoretical definition of a given machine
learning model’s attack surface for use as a metric

•

Validate the proposed metric.
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The validation was conducted against two distinct types of data, using existing wellknown algorithms suited for the purpose with one of the datasets being well known and
heavily used in scientific research and the other being randomly generated arbitrary data to
ensure any effects are not merely artifacts of a poorly trained or employed algorithm or a
flawed dataset. A strong positive correlation between attack surface reduction and reduced
adversarial example effectiveness was considered supporting evidence for the validity of the
theory, while a weak or negative correlation was considered evidence refuting the theory and
would also be of significant interest as it would indicate that intuitive assumptions about what
comprises the attack surface may be incorrect.

Organization of this paper
This paper is organized in accordance with Table 1 below:
Chapter 1

Introduction
Background of the Problem
Adversarial Machine Learning
Problem Statement
Objectives

Chapter 2

Literature Review
Introduction
Machine Learning in Image Classification
Adversarial Example Generation
Adversarial Example Defenses
Existing Vulnerability/Attack Surface
Metrics
Conclusion
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Chapter 3

Theory and Methodology
Introduction
Assumptions
Constraints
Theory
Validation
Data Collection

Chapter 4

Results and Discussion
3-Class Dataset, Best Models
3-Class Dataset, Neural Networks
3-Class Dataset, SVMs
3-Class Dataset Overall Results & Findings
6-Class Dataset, Best Models
6-Class Dataset, Neural Networks
6-Class Dataset, SVMs
6-Class Dataset, Overall Results & Findings
9-Class Dataset, Best Models
9-Class Dataset, Neural Networks
9-Class Dataset, SVMs
9-Class Dataset, Overall Results & Findings
Cross-Dataset, Neural Networks
Cross-Dataset, SVMs

Chapter 5

Conclusions
Conclusions
Lessons Learned
Areas for Future Work

Table 1. Organization of this paper.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This chapter contains a review of the existing relevant literature. The literature review
strategy included a review of all papers published in the time-period of 2010-2020 to get an
accurate picture of the current state of research in the field. A time-period of 10 years was
chosen to ensure that the research questions had not simply been addressed so thoroughly in
the past that they were left out of more recent (< 5 years) research. This literature review
discusses the types of machine learning algorithms applied to the image classification domain,
a discussion of several adversarial example generation techniques, and concludes with a
discussion of various adversarial example defensive mechanisms.

Machine Learning Algorithms in Image Classification
The Computer Vision and Image Classification problem domain is one of the areas
with extensive machine learning integration, and an active area of research both in the areas
of image classification itself as well as adversarial examples. As discussed in a 2017 overview
of common deep learning algorithms and their applications by Liu, et al., Autoencoders and
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are two of the most prominently utilized machine
learning algorithms for image classification problems. Additional research by Horning (2010)
showed that image classification can be effectively addressed by non-Deep Learning models
such as Random Forests.
In the introduction to their 2017 landmark paper discussion the application of CNNs to
the problem of image classification, Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton remark that as
recently as 2013 a paper applying Deep Learning methods, meaning machine learning
requiring no human intervention, to the problem of image classification was rejected as it was
believed at the time that the only substantial advances in the area would come from improved
supervised learning methods, not deep learning techniques. An overview of this traditional,
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supervised approach is outlined in Figure 3. Note the necessary inclusion of Domain Experts,
or human based classifiers, in this workflow. The requirement for human intervention
provides a significant overhead both in terms of training the model and introducing a new
potential source of error through simple human errors and mistakes.

Figure 3. Traditional Supervised Machine Learning Image Classification Workflow. (Wu et al.,
2020)

Within the span of a few years, research and the results of major image classification
competitions would show this viewpoint to be woefully mistaken, as the automated feature
extraction and learning inherent in deep learning algorithms such as Autoencoders and CNNs
provided significant improvements both in overall performance (training time and
classification time) and accuracy (correct classifications). Since then, both CNNs and
Autoencoders have come to represent the state-of-the-art for image classification, with CNNs
being somewhat more popular with multiple CNN image classification models being provided
by several machine learning frameworks. An example CNN image classifier is presented in
Figure 4 and an Autoencoder in Figure 5. Note the complete absence of any human
intervention in either process.
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Figure 4. Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) Image Classifier Architecture. (Machado, Silva, &
Goldschmidt, 2020)

Figure 5. Autoencoder Image Classifier Architecture. (Machado, Silva, & Goldschmidt, 2020)

Examining both the above architectures can lead one to conclude that both approaches
are similar, and indeed they are. The primary differences lie in approach, autoencoders are
focused on generating an output which is as similar as possible to the provided input using an
internal compressed representation of the input as a mapping function. Convolutional Neural
Networks on the other hand, focus on extracting features from the input and generating a
mapping function in this way, which then allows a mapping of input to output for additional
inputs once training is complete (Machado, et al., 2020). A noteworthy property of CNNs
which contributed to the theoretical portions of this research is that once the training phase is
complete and the mapping function or weights generated by the convolutional portion of the
algorithm these weights can then be “frozen” and incorporated into a simpler classification
component which handles the actual mapping of inputs to image classes, without needing to
re-run the convolutional layers of the algorithm. This results in significant performance
improvements after the initial training is complete and can allow different groups of weights
from models trained to different parameters to be utilized by a single activation function
simplifying the validation phase of the research.
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In their 2014 paper “Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks”, Mirza and
Osindero expand upon earlier work by Goodfellow, et al., (2014) and show applications of
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to the image classification domain. GANs utilize
two functions: a Generator, and a Discriminator, and the two functions operate on principles
from Game Theory, whereby the Generator attempts to create examples which fool the
Discriminator, and the results of this ongoing game are then used to improve the
Discriminator in an iterative fashion.

Adversarial Example Generation
As mentioned previously, an overwhelming majority of the existing adversarial
example work is in the field of image classification. This domain focus is primarily for two
reasons. Firstly, image classification and computer vision are one of the major areas of
ongoing machine learning research as well as one of the longest running such applications of
machine learning, thus the problem domain and how machine learning fits into the domain are
well known and documented. Additionally, image file modification for adversarial example
generation is relatively trivial to accomplish, image file structures tend to exhibit large
sequences of binary data describing colors and positions, the modification of which only
changes the resulting image when displayed while still maintaining a valid file
structure/format. Thus, attackers can extensively modify image files without worrying about
rendering the file invalid, and many small changes can be imperceptible to the human eye yet
have substantial effects on the classification decision (Machado, Silva, & Goldschmidt, 2020).
Like many types of attack models, adversarial examples can be separated into
traditional White Box, where an attacker has access to all information about the classification
model and defensive techniques employed, and Black Box attacks, where the attacker has no
such knowledge (Machado, Silva, & Goldschmidt, 2020). Dongyu Meng and Hao Chen
extended these definitions to include the category of Grey Box attacks, where an attacker has
some information about the model but no information on any defensive techniques employed,
in 2017. There are, broadly, two main categories of adversarial example attacks, Gradient
Based attacks which are by far the most predominant, and the rejection sampling decisionbased attacks which were introduced by Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge in 2017 and operate on
small perturbations from the desired classification sample.
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Gradient-Based attacks can be separated into five predominant approaches/algorithms:
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), Fast-Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), Basic Iterative
Method (BIM), DeepFool, and the Carlini & Wagner Attack (CWAttack). These gradientbased attacks focus on exploiting generalization errors inherent in the classifier algorithms,
these errors arise because often the decision boundary between two or more classes is not a
sharp boundary but rather a smooth curve, allowing an attacker to gradually move along this
decision curve via subtle tweaks to affect the final classification result.
FGSM was first described by Goodfellow, Schlens, and Szegedy as an explanation for
the very existence of adversarial examples (2015). FGSM has the notable advantage of being
computationally inexpensive as it operates by tweaking a given image in the direction that
maximizes the error curve of the model, though this also presents a downside in that FGSMderived adversarial examples tend to have much larger changes to the starting image and are
less effective at fooling classifiers than other examples.
PGD and its variants such as Projected Gradient Descent with Linear Search (PGDLS)
were developed in a series of papers by Biggio, Corona, et al., (2013), Melis, et al., (2017)
and Demontis, et al., (2017) and focused on generating adversarial examples using confidence
ratings instead of minimum-distance methods previously in vogue such as FGSM. Attacks
based on maximum-confidence methods were shown to be significantly more transferrable
and could bypass defenses such as gradient masking (Demontis, et al., 2017) and the
conceptual difference between maximum-confidence and minimum-distance attacks is
illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Conceptual difference between maximum-confidence and minimum-distance attacks.
(Demontis, et al., 2017)
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BIM-based approaches were developed by Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio (2016a)
as an extension of FGSM, essentially providing an iterative implementation of FGSM which
executes several smaller steps that each slightly modify the input file, resulting in a greater
number of smaller modifications as contrasted with FGSM’s single, large modifications and is
better able to fool classification algorithms for the cost of additional algorithm steps to
generate each adversarial example. DeepFool attacks, published in a 2016 paper by SeyedMohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard take a slightly different
approach. DeepFool attacks focus on finding the decision or classification boundaries that
separate different classification decisions and then modify the input image in a way that its
classification moves towards this decision boundary, slightly perturbing the input in each step
until it finally crosses the decision boundary and becomes an Adversarial Example. Finally,
the CWAttack developed by Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner represents what is arguably
the state-of-the-art in terms of adversarial example generation, operating through the use of
gradient descent to calculate the minimum amount of perturbation necessary to fool the
classifier using the given parameters (2017b).
Finally, Papernot, et al., (2018) published an open-source image classification
adversarial example generation framework named “CleverHans”, which implements the
above-described techniques/algorithms along with several others and works with models
generated by major model frameworks such as Keras (Chollet, 2015).

Adversarial Example Defenses
Defensive techniques against adversarial examples can be placed into two categories,
proactive and reactive. Proactive defenses are those attempting to prevent adversarial example
attacks either by hindering the example generation process or by lessening the model’s
susceptibility to adversarial examples. Reactive defenses are those attempting to identify a
successful adversarial example attack, often employing additional models designed to filter
and detect malicious inputs or statistical methods attempting to identify deviations in
behavior. Reactive defenses are outside the scope of this research, as they can essentially be
thought of as additional layers of defense surrounding the model itself, and this research is
focused on the attack surface of the individual models, not that of their entire ecosystem. A
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comparison would be examining the security and attack surface of an Operating System
without regard for any additional security functionality added on by the end-users such as
anti-virus software or firewalls. As such, only proactive defenses will be examined.
The three most prominent proactive defensive techniques employed today are
Adversarial Training, Distillation, and Gradient Hiding. Adversarial Training is at its core,
simply the inclusion of adversarial examples in the dataset used to train the model and was
first introduced by Szegedy, et al., in their 2013 paper “Intriguing properties of neural
networks.” Though extensive research has shown the effectiveness of Adversarial Training
such as work by Zantedeschi, Nicolae, and Rawat (2017); Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio
(2016b); Madry, et al., (2017); Tramer, et al., (2017); and Huang, et al., (2015) there remain
several significant shortcomings with this technique. Namely, the significant computational
cost of generating sufficient adversarial examples for inclusion in the training set, though
frameworks such as CleverHans (Papernot, et al., 2018) have reduced the effort required to
generate these examples. Additionally, Adversarial Training is vulnerable to the development
of novel attacks and techniques which differ from those used to generate the adversarial
examples included in the initial training set, as the model has not been exposed to these attack
types it will be vulnerable, though some residual resistance may be present from being
exposed to a significant training set size. Therefore, the non-Generalizability of Adversarial
Training represents a significant drawback.
Distillation is a technique developed by Hinton, et al., (2015) which takes advantage
of the inherent property of ‘distillation’ inherent to machine learning algorithms, where
information learned by one model can be used to train a second model. Essentially, a first
model trains on a dataset and learns to classify the images into various categories and then
provides probabilistic weights (90% chance image is ‘X’ instead of the 100% chance the
model originally used) which are then used to train a second model. This second model has
the advantage of being significantly simpler than the first model which may be extraordinarily
complex and has been shown to resist certain types of attacks such as FGSM according to
2016 results from Papernot & McDaniel. The disadvantage of the distillation approach is that
it is even less generalizable than Adversarial Training and requires the creation and training of
an entire additional model which is then used to train the actual classification model. There is
also the notable drawback that this defensive technique has only been shown to be effective
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against some types of attacks, and not all, meaning existing attacks and those developed in the
future may render it completely ineffective.
The third major defensive technique listed previously is that of Gradient Hiding. As
discussed in the second section on adversarial example generation, a significant number of
adversarial example generation techniques revolve around exploiting the Gradient inherent in
classification models, so an intuitive defensive technique is to attempt to mask or “hide” this
Gradient and render it unavailable to attackers. If the decision boundary between classes can
be sharpened such that it represents a vertical line rather than a curve, this reduces the ability
of the attacker to ride along the curve through subtle manipulation of the input to affect the
classification. Unfortunately, this seemingly intuitive defensive technique completely fails for
the same reason that Distillation-based techniques work, the ability to transfer knowledge
between different models as outlined by Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner (2018); Papernot, et al.,
(2016); and Papernot, McDaniel, Goodfellow, et al. (2016). Essentially, an attacker who
wishes to generate adversarial examples against a model employing Gradient Hiding can
create their own substitute model through providing a series of carefully crafted inputs to the
target model and tracking the classification decisions generated in the output stage. This
substitute model will not have the same Gradient Hiding defenses employed yet will mimic
the actual behavior of the target model, the attacker then uses the substitute model as the
target for their adversarial example generation. These examples will then be effective against
the target model, even though they were generated from the substitute model. An example
showing the distinct gradients between the target and substitute models is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 7. Gradients in Defended vs Substitute Models. (Goodfellow & Papernot, cleverhans-blog,
2017).

Additional defensive techniques such as hybrid or ensemble defenses like “MagNet”
(Meng & Chen, 2017) which combine proactive and reactive defensive techniques or multiple
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types of Gradient Hiding techniques etc. have also been shown to be ineffective through the
works of Tramer, et al., (2020) and Carlini and Wagner (2017a).

Existing Vulnerability/Attack Surface Metrics
There is currently no existing conclusive method for calculating the susceptibility of a
machine learning model to adversarial examples. Some recent work examining the issue
includes a 2019 paper by Dong, et al., which explored benchmarking techniques for resistance
against adversarial examples. Dong, et al., performed various attacks against different models
both with and without defensive measures in place, and recorded how each model’s accuracy
changed in relation to changing perturbation budgets or other attack parameters. Though their
work was insightful and heavily inspired the Validation portion of this dissertation, it should
be noted that their primary efforts were focused on validating their methodology and drawing
general trends about the performance of various classes of models and defensive techniques
against varying attacks, not on developing or analyzing an attack surface metric. Other
insights into what makes models vulnerable to adversarial examples were reported by
Demontis, et al., in a study on the transferability of adversarial examples between models,
who noted that input gradient, among other things, is a significant component in determining
whether an adversarial example generated against one model is likely to work against another,
with models having similar input gradients likely to be vulnerable to the same given
adversarial example (2019). This work hints that there is some fundamental property, which is
independent of the actual internal structure of the model, that determines the effectiveness of
adversarial example attacks against it. Like Dong, et al.; Demontis, et al., also do not go so far
as to propose a metric for measuring the attack surface of a model, and their research was
focused on the transferability of attacks between models, not on the actual properties that
make a given model vulnerable.

Conclusion
There are many techniques for generating adversarial examples in the image
classification domain, each with various advantages and drawbacks. Likewise, there are
several different defensive techniques, though each comes with significant limitations and
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shortcomings and there is not a one-size-fits-all solution to defending against adversarial
examples. Even hybrid and ensemble-based approaches can be bypassed by clever and
resourceful attackers.
There is currently a lack of understanding of what constitutes the attack surface of a
model to adversarial examples, though recent work in measuring model performance against
such attacks and in understanding how attacks can transfer between models show that this is
still an active area of research and development of such a metric would be of great interest.
The lack of insight into such a core principle of how to defend a system from attack, the
attack surface, serves as one explanation for the significant gap between the effectiveness of
attack techniques and the comparative ineffectiveness of defensive techniques. There is
simply no understanding as to what even constitutes the attack surface of a Machine Learning
model in the first place, which is what will be explored in this research.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter focuses on outlining the theoretical concerns regarding the proposed
definition of a machine learning model attack surface metric against adversarial examples, as
well as the methodology by which the theory will be verified or refuted. The main
components of the theory defining the attack surface metric were included in a poster paper I
wrote which was published at IEEE INFOCOM (Bradley & Xu, 2021), the main points are
repeated herein.
As has been shown through the literature review, there is no existing attack surface
metric, thus necessitating the creation of one. Creation of such a metric will allow a more
thorough examination as to what the vulnerable components of a given machine learning
model truly are and inform research into defensive techniques by ensuring a more complete
understanding of what is and is not important when determining vulnerability to adversarial
examples. This theoretical definition of an attack surface metric will be created by
extrapolating from conditions inherent to machine learning models used for classification
(classifiers). Such a definition should have several useful properties and operate under several
constraints and limitations, outlined in the following sections.

Assumptions
For the purposes of defining an attack surface metric, a key assumption is that any
classification decision other than the “true” or correct classification by the model is a
successful attack, without regard to the actual classification decision made by the model. In
other words, an image of a basketball which is classified as anything other than a basketball
by the model is a successful attack, regardless of it the model classified it as an airplane or a
car, etc. The technical term for these types of attacks is an untargeted attack, in contrast to a
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targeted attack which would aim to have the classifier label the sample as a specific erroneous
class, e.g., classifying an image of a basketball as an airplane but not a car.

Constraints
•

Constraint 1: The proposed metric must be intuitive and easy to reason with.

•

Constraint 2: The proposed metric must use only properties inherent to the
model under examination and these properties must be generalizable across all
similar models, it must be model and implementation agnostic.

•

Constraint 3: The proposed metric must be valid for classification models
(CNNs, Simple Neural Networks, Support Vector Machines, etc.) for ease of
development. It may apply to other types of models, but that will be left for
future work.

•

Constraint 4: Though the calculation of the metric may be conducted against a
specific test dataset, it should be applicable to items outside the test dataset
provided they are similar to items the model has been trained and tested
against. Additionally, the accuracy against the test dataset is assumed to be less
than 1, as a model with perfect accuracy against the test data may be suffering
from overfitting, a factor which is likely to affect the model’s susceptibility to
adversarial examples in unknown ways, which are outside the scope of this
research.

•

Constraint 5: The metric should be valid for White-Box attacks, though ideally
it would also apply to Black-Box attacks.

Theory
Given the previous constraints, our definition of the attack surface will focus on two
properties inherent to all parameterized classifiers, the “state space” and the “deviancy”. For
the purposes of this paper, the state space is defined as the maximum number of possible input
and output states of the model, ignoring all internal or ‘hidden’ states/layers. An important
caveat for this definition is that it assumes that all possible states are reachable when in reality
not all given combinations of inputs and outputs may be reachable. Furthermore, no
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determination is made as to whether these states are inherently useful for an attacker, only that
they exist. The focus on state space is justified as a necessary component for adversarial
examples to succeed, an attacker cannot influence non-existent input states, nor can they have
an input classified into a non-existent output state. The focus only on input and output layers
to the exclusion of the interior layers is justified by the fact that these interior layers are
frequently referred to as “hidden layers” because their actual effects tend to disappear after
the training phase has concluded, a property frequently utilized in Convolutional Neural
Networks. Furthermore, defensive techniques such as Distillation which allows knowledge
gained by one model to be applied to another model for the same dataset show that the first
(input) and last (output) layers are the dominant architectural factors utilized in many attacks.
The learned knowledge of a model being abstract or Model complexity, specifically input
gradients, as a component of vulnerability to adversarial examples is acknowledged by
Demontis, et al., in their 2019 paper on adversarial example transferability, further justifying
the inclusion of state space as a component of an attack surface measurement. Additionally,
excluding these interior layers significantly simplifies the attack surface calculation and
enables it to be generalized to models which may lack these interior layers entirely such as
Random Forests or Logistic Regression. For a model with 𝑁 input parameters and 𝑀 output
classes, the state space is defined according to equation 1:

𝜎 = 𝑁𝑀
Equation 1. State Space for N input parameters and M output classes

The “deviancy” component of the metric is defined as the amount of variation from a
theoretically perfect classifier, i.e., a classifier which is never wrong. A perfect classifier is an
important theoretical construct as from their very definition these classifiers are immune to
adversarial examples, thus any classifier which is susceptible to adversarial example attacks
must deviate from a perfect classifier. Though a perfect classifier would have an accuracy of
1, there is an important distinction between the theoretical perfect classifier and a classifier
which has an accuracy of 1 against the given dataset; a perfect classifier has an accuracy of 1
in all cases, including against adversarial examples and items outside the dataset it is being
tested against, it is thus a purely theoretical concept distinct from a model which has an

21
accuracy of 1 against the test dataset. The deviancy of a model is defined according to
Equation 2, where the ‘accuracy’ component is the Balanced Accuracy of the model:

𝛿 = 1 – 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦
Equation 2. Deviancy metric.

Given the previous definition of the state space and deviancy, these two values can be
combined to yield the attack surface of the model, as defined by Equation 3:

𝜆 = 𝜎⋅𝛿
Equation 3. Attack Surface Metric (𝜆) calculation for given State Space (𝜎) and Deviancy (𝛿).

A quick examination of this definition shows that it has several useful, intuitive
properties, namely, a model with the maximum possible deviancy (one which is always
incorrect, a ‘perfect mis-classifier’) would have its vulnerability bounded only by the number
of available states for an attacker to target, in other words: 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝜎 × 𝛿 (𝐸𝑞. 3) =
𝑁 𝑀 × 𝛿 (𝐸𝑞. 1) = 𝑁 𝑀 , for the case of maximum deviancy, 𝛿 = 1.
Additionally, a theoretical perfect classifier would have a deviancy, 𝛿 = 0, and would
thus have an attack surface metric of 0 by: 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝜎 × 𝛿 (𝐸𝑞. 3) = 𝑁 𝑀 × 𝛿 (𝐸𝑞. 1) =
𝑁 𝑀 × 0 = 0, further matching the intuition of how an attack surface for classifiers should
function.
There are some important constraints to this formula, the number of input and output
states are both assumed to be greater than 1, as a model which can only classify a sample into
a single class can be considered not to be a true classifier, and a model which only considers a
single feature for classification is more analogous to conditional programming such as if/else
or a case/switch statement that evaluates the feature based on its value.
One important consequence of this metric definition is that the magnitude of the
metric value generated depends significantly on the state space of the target model. While the
deviancy component of the metric does serve to reduce the size of the metric values
generated, the exponentiation involved in calculating the state space can quickly generate
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huge values requiring scientific notation to express when very complicated data with many
features or classes is being used. Thus, the quickest way to reduce the attack surface is
through reducing the state space, whether by reducing the number of input classes, output
classes, or both. This state space reduction could be accomplished through techniques such as
dimensionality reduction and/or feature selection as well in the case that simply using fewer
classes or removing features from the model/data are not viable. It is also worth noting that
there is no standardized range of metric values in general, as this would require knowing
every possible combination of state space and deviancy for all models and all datasets.
However, if a specific set of models against a specific dataset is under consideration, it would
be possible to create a scale of values between 0 and 1 by using the lowest measured attack
surface as the zero value and the highest measured attack surface as the one value, with the
intermediate attack surface values falling between these two extremes. Such a range
generation approach was not used here, but is worth noting for future work which may be
more comprehensive in nature.
Finally, given that this proposed attack surface metric is intended to be model
agnostic, two competing models should be comparable on the basis of their calculated attack
surface metric with the result showing their comparable vulnerability to adversarial examples,
namely, two models with similar attack surface metrics should be similarly vulnerable to
attack via adversarial examples, even if their respective state spaces or deviancies are
different and even if the models themselves were trained on different datasets and were
constructed using different architectures. Each model should have its own attack surface
calculated separately since individual model features may vary, particularly if input layer
transformations are being utilized to reduce the state space. However, should this metric
become widely accepted in its current or a variant formulation, it is possible that benchmark
scores will be developed for specific cases such as a given set of models against a specific
dataset, enabling comparisons based on difference from the benchmarks.

Validation
The remainder of this dissertation will be devoted to the validation of the previously
defined theoretical attack surface metric (Eq. 3). This validation was conducted using an
Experimental methodology and borrowed from the benchmarking approach of Dong, et al.,
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(2019), specifically their association of model accuracy against adversarial examples versus
varying perturbation budgets for a given attack as a method of measuring robustness against
adversarial examples. Random data, specifically clustered sets of coordinates in an x, y-plane
was used for initial exploration and validation of the theory due to concerns that more
structured data such as image files or malware samples might skew the results since
adversarial example generation may only be able to alter some portions of a sample or may be
restricted in what perturbations it could perform, e.g. feature addition generally not posing
problems for malware but feature removal potentially rendering the malware sample nonfunctional as a program. Datasets consisting of 3, 6, and 9 classes were created. These
datasets consisted of clusters of coordinate sets organized around a central point for each
cluster, within a standard deviation of 0.6, with the 3-class dataset containing 3 clusters of
points, the 6-class dataset containing 6 clusters of points, and the 9-class dataset containing 9
clusters of points.
Validation was conducted using SecML (Melis, et al., 2019) a python library for
machine learning which supports generating large numbers of adversarial examples and
contains useful features such as generating security evaluation curves which evaluate model
accuracy against various perturbation budgets for a given attack. Additionally, SecML
contains numerous tutorials and examples of creating and testing models under the datasets
identified for use in the experimental validation of the theory, reducing the chance of user
error affecting the results. SecML supports models constructed using the popular Scikit-learn
framework (Pedregosa, et al., 2011) as well as PyTorch (Paszke, et al., 2019), and for
validation I focused on two model architectures, Support Vector Machines, and Neural
Networks. Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are useful for validation as they perform well
under various datasets and are good, general-purpose models which are frequently used for
classification problems. Additionally, SVMs can support multiple kernel architectures which
determine the interior architecture of the model such as a Linear Kernel or a Radial Basis
Framework (RBF) Kernel (Smola & Scholkopf, 2004). Three SVMs were included in the
validation, one with a Linear Kernel, one with an RBF Kernel and one with a Polynomial
Kernel. Three Neural Networks were also included to have a significantly different model
architecture in the validation phase and since Neural Networks are notable for exhibiting
properties such as hidden layers used in the justification of the theoretical development of the
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metric. The Neural Networks used were largely identical structurally, each having the same
number of neurons and layers, for models within the same dataset as well as across datasets.
The Neural Networks differed in terms of activation function, with one model using a
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function, another using a Sigmoid activation
function, and the third using a Hyperbolic Tangent (Tanh) activation function. Together, these
three activation functions represent the three most commonly chosen activation functions,
though ReLU is significantly more popular and has largely replaced the other two functions
due to being significantly easier to train and analyze, less computationally complex, and
immunity to the common ‘vanishing gradient’ problem which can plague models using a
hyperbolic tangent or especially a sigmoid activation function (Glorot, Bordes, & Bengio,
2011; Hanin, 2018). Though varying model architecture may have resulted in better or more
accurate models, it also posed a risk of introducing confounding factors which may have
affected model performance against adversarial examples. Thus, a single architecture was
used for all Networks to ensure that only factors considered by the attack surface metric or
hyperparameters which only affect the training phase varied. The SVM models were also kept
as structurally similar as possible, varying from each other only in their hyperparameters and
kernel functions. SVMs as well as simple feed-forward Neural Networks like those used in
this experiment have previously been used in similar experimental setups such as the 2019
study on transferability conducted by Biggio, Demontis, et al., justifying their inclusion in the
validation of the theory under examination in this dissertation.
For generating adversarial examples, SecML’s built-in version of the PGD will be
used, specifically the Projected Gradient Descent with Line Search version of the attack. This
attack was selected for three reasons, SecML’s own documentation shows examples utilizing
this attack for models and datasets similar to those intended for the experimental validation of
this theory, reducing the chance of incorrect attack parameters leading to erroneous results.
Secondly, the built-in version of the attack will create an adversarial example for each item in
the test dataset, enabling the quick generation of hundreds of adversarial examples for a given
perturbation budget to test the model performance against. Finally, though SecML supports
the inclusion of attacks from Cleverhans (Papernot, et al., 2018) and Foolbox (Rauber,
Bethge, & Brendel, 2017) (Rauber, Zimmerman, Bethge, & Brendel, 2020), the Cleverhans
attacks are incompatible with SecML’s security evaluation curve functionality and generate
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only a single adversarial example at a time and the required iteration needed to generate a test
corpus of adversarial examples quickly became unfeasible for performance on the hardware
used in the experiment. Foolbox attacks simply failed to function at all despite verifying the
correct imports were used, even when attempting to run code directly copied from a tutorial
using Foolbox the attacks still failed and generated errors, so these attacks were unfortunately
also unable to be utilized for the experiment. Though ideally the validation would have
included a more varied set of attacks, no other library or framework offers the required
functionality and attempting to extend SecML to natively support alternate attacks posed
unacceptable risks to data integrity if these implementations were later found to be faulty, thus
limiting testing to a single attack type. The attack was run against the l2 norm as it allowed me
to control the maximum perturbation through use of a perturbation budget, which can be
varied to measure how the model performs against increasingly powerful attacks.
Initial attempts to include more models were hampered by SecML still being in an
alpha state of release, even its own built-in models did not always provide the necessary
functions for the attacks to work, despite those functions appearing on SecML’s own API
documentation. Nevertheless, six different models against multiple datasets enabled
exploration of the theory and sufficient data to draw tentative conclusions from as well as
provide avenues for future work. Since PGDLS is a White-Box attack, the validation did not
extend to exploring whether the proposed metric also applies to Black-Box attacks. SecML
does also support malware adversarial examples via SecML-Malware (Demetrio & Biggio,
2021), however SecML-Malware is in an even earlier stage of development than the base
SecML, and lacks much documentation, functionality, and other resources which precluded
its use as an additional avenue for validation at the time this research was conducted.
Validation was conducted by training the model against a given dataset and evaluating
its performance against the test set. 5-fold Cross-Validation was used in order to ensure model
accuracy and avoid overfitting, with SecML’s estimateparameters() function used to identify
appropriate model hyperparameters. The accuracy against the test set was used to calculate
the deviancy portion of the proposed attack surface metric (Eq. 1), and the number of features
and classes corresponding to N and M, respectively, allowing the computation of the state
space or sigma portion of the attack surface metric (Eq. 2). Sigma and delta were then
multiplied together yielding lambda, the proposed attack surface metric, as outlined in
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Equation 3. With the initial attack surface calculation complete, the model was then subjected
to adversarial example attack through PGDLS against the test dataset for varying perturbation
budgets, and its accuracy at each perturbation budget was recorded, with a security evaluation
curve generated for each model. This procedure was conducted for each model against each of
the three datasets with the best Neural Net and SVM, as defined by best accuracy against the
test dataset, being compared directly to analyze the metric’s ability to compare different
models. In the event of a tie, with two models having the same accuracy against the test
dataset, both models were used. Additionally, each of the Neural Net and SVM models which
qualified as “good” classifiers (defined as an arbitrary cutoff of 75% accuracy against the test
set, though in actual scenarios a much higher accuracy may be the cutoff for a successful
model, a wider range of accuracies was used for this experiment to maximize usable data
collection while balancing the risk of a model being a poor fit for the data) against a given
dataset were compared to explore use of the metric as a comparison between different
versions of the same model (i.e. comparing the three SVMs with different kernels based on
their attack surfaces). Finally, all models meeting the requirement as a “good” classifier were
compared across datasets to explore how the metric applies to different versions of the same
or substantially similar model.
The decision to restrict comparisons to “good” classifiers was made in order to
emulate models which could plausibly be used in real applications against the test data.
Furthermore, as the accuracy approaches 50% a classifier becomes only slightly better than
pure random chance, with it being exactly as good as a purely random classifier at accuracy =
50%. Since adversarial example attacks revolve around causing misclassification, it is
unknown how model performance will decay as a classifier approaches the performance level
of a random classifier, or how it performs should the accuracy be below 50%, even worse
than classifying by random. Thus, the need to restrict primary analysis to models which
perform well against the data, and since there is no settled definition of what separates a good
classifier from a merely tolerable one which is still better than pure random classification, a
cutoff accuracy value of 75% was selected.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the Data Collection portion of the experiment,
using the process described in this section. The actual experimental results and conclusions
reached are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, of this dissertation.
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Data Collection
All setup, dataset creation, manipulation, model creation and manipulation tasks were
conducted on a single Windows 11 PC with an Intel i7-11800H processor. The programming
was conducted in Jupyter Notebook running on Python v3.7.9, and the Machine Learning and
data-related tasks were performed using the SecML library v0.15. Certain SecML functions
permit an optional random_seed value as an argument which serves as the seed for random
processes used by that function. In all cases, an arbitrary value of ‘500’ was chosen as
the random_seed where such values were expected/allowed. Six different models from two
different model families (SVMs and Neural Networks) were tested against three different
datasets and a single attack type. The datasets consisted of random sets of coordinates in an
x,y plane representing generic random data organized into clusters, with one dataset having 3
clusters representing 3 classes of data, one dataset having 6 clusters representing 6 classes of
data, and the final dataset having 9 clusters representing 9 classes of data. The distribution of
points between classes was unweighted, each class was as likely as any other class.
Generation of the random datasets was accomplished through
the SecML function CDLRandomBlobs in order to generate clusters of arbitrary random data
located within a coordinate plane. In these datasets, each has two features for each datapoint
(x, y coordinates), this value was kept constant through all three trials, only the number
of clusters (classes), classes 1-3 for the three-class dataset, 1-6 for the six-class dataset, and 19 for the nine-class dataset were varied to ensure model behavior remained largely the same
between datasets/trials and for ease of visualization. The other specified values for the
datasets include coordinates for each cluster of data, with the number of coordinate pairs
corresponding to the number of classes, as well as a standard deviation for each cluster (kept
constant at a value of ‘0.6’) and each cluster generally being around 2 units in the x or y-plane
from its nearest neighbor, ensuring that the clusters contain some overlap but are largely
distinct. 2500 samples were generated for each dataset, with 2000 being used for training and
500 for testing. Only the set of cluster coordinates was varied between the datasets, with the
first dataset containing three clusters centered around coordinates [-2, 0], [0, 0], and [2, 0]; the
second dataset contained six clusters centered around coordinates [-2, 0], [0, 0], [2, 0], [2, 2],
[-2, -2], and [0, 2]; and the third dataset containing nine clusters centered around coordinates
[-2, 0], [0, 0], [2, 0], [2, 2], [-2, -2], [0, 2], [0, -2], [-2, 2], and [2, -2]. Each dataset was
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randomly split between testing and training sets through use of
the CTrainTestSplit function, 2000 elements being assigned as training data and 500 to
testing data. Both the testing and training datasets were then normalized
via a CNormalizerMinMax object to normalize all data values to between 0 and 1, inclusive.
The training dataset is then visualized by use of a figure and the plot_ds() function in order
to visually verify that the dataset appears as expected. The visualization of each of the three
datasets is shown below in Figure 8, with each color corresponding to a different cluster or
class of data.

Figure 8. Visualization of random blobs training datasets with 3, 6, and 9 classes. Different colors
represent different classes.

After dataset generation came Model generation, SecML’s PyTorch functionality is
leveraged to create three simple Neural Networks, each consisting of a single hidden layer
with 50 neurons, a value that was found to work well through testing, and either a ReLU,
Sigmoid, or Tanh activation function. The Neural Networks used CrossEntropyLoss for their
Criterion and SGD as an optimizer, initialized with lr=0.001, momentum=0.9, though these
parameters were updated during the k-fold validation and parameter search process, and
epochs=10. Three SVM models are also generated at this time, one with a Linear kernel, one
with an RBF Kernel, and one with a Polynomial Kernel. Model architectures/structure was
kept as constant as possible between datasets, with versions of the same model trained on a
different dataset (i.e., the version of an SVM with Linear Kernel trained on the 3-class dataset
vs the SVM with Linear Kernel trained on the 6 or 9-class datasets) varying only in their
number of output classes and potentially hyperparameters. Likewise, models within the same
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‘family’ were kept as similar as possible, with the three Neural Networks varying only in their
activation functions, and the three SVMs varying only in their kernel functions. Allowing
more variation between dataset versions and between individual models may have resulted in
more performant models, however it also would have significantly complicated analysis and
may have added in additional variables not considered in this experiment, undermining
potential results.
All six models were trained and validated through k-fold cross-validation, with a value
of k=5, hyperparameters were optimized using SecML’s estimateparameters() function which
appears to function off GridSearchCV, though this was not explicitly denoted either in the
library documentation or the source code. Each Model was trained against the training portion
of the dataset through the CClassifier.fit function, and then tested against the testing dataset
via CClassifier.predict. Accuracy of the classifier against the test dataset was captured
through CMetricAccuracy, comparing the labels on the test dataset to those predicted by the
model. The attack surface was also calculated at this time, using the formula from Equations
1-3: λ = σ*δ, σ = NM, and δ = 1 – accuracy (calculated previously), where N is the number of
input states (i.e., the number of features, held constant at 2 for this experiment) and M is the
number of output states (varying between either 3, 6, or 9 depending on which dataset is being
tested). The decision regions for the classifier were also visualized through use of a figure and
the plot_decision_regions function, enabling comparison against the visualized dataset.
Hyperparameters for the various Neural Network models were as follows: for the 3class dataset the Neural Net (ReLU) used lr = 0.0001 and momentum = 0.8, the Neural Net
(Sigmoid) used lr = 0.0001 and momentum = 0.9, the Neural Net (Tanh) used lr = 0.0001 and
momentum = 0.8. For the 6-class dataset the Neural Net (ReLU) used lr = 0.00001 and
momentum = 1.0, the Neural Net (Sigmoid) used lr = 0.0001 and momentum = 0.8, and the
Neural Net (Tanh) used lr = 0.00001 and momentum = 0.8. Against the 9-class dataset, the
Neural Net (ReLU) had lr = 0.00001 and momentum = 1.0, the Neural Net (Sigmoid) used lr
= 0.00001 and momentum = 0.8, and finally the Neural Net (Tanh) had lr = 0.0001 and
momentum = 0.9.
For the SVMs, hyperparameters were as follows: the 3-class dataset SVM (Linear) had
C = 10,000.0, the SVM (RBF) had C = 10.0 and γ = 1.0, and the SVM (Poly) used C = 1.0,
degree = 4, coef0 = 1.0, and γ = 1.0. As for the models trained against the 6-class dataset, the
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SVM (Linear) used C = 10,000.0, the SVM (RBF) used C = 0.1 and γ = 100.0, and the SVM
(Poly) had C = 0.01, degree = 4, coef0 = 1.0, and γ = 10.0. Lastly, the 9-class dataset versions
utilized C = 100,000.0 for SVM (Linear), C = 100.0 and γ = 10.0 for SVM (RBF), and the
SVM (Poly) used C = 0.1, degree = 4, coef0 = 10.0, and γ = 1.0.
Attack setup was conducted next, using the single attack supported by SecML, a
Projected Gradient Descent with Line Search attack (PGDLS). The attack is created through
an instance of CAttackEvasionPGDLS conducted against the l2 norm through specifying ‘l2’
as the distance, 0 and 1 for the lower and upper bounds lb and ub, respectively,
a y_target value of None is specified for an untargeted attack. An eta value of 0.3, eta-min of
0.1, eta-max of None, and epsilon of 1e-4 were also chosen as the attack parameters, along
with a perturbation budget value that will be varied between 0.1 and 1.0. These parameters
were selected from a SecML tutorial on using its adversarial example generation functionality
and through testing were shown to perform well against these models (2021). The attack is
then run against the target classifier a total of nine times, for each perturbation budget value
between 0.1 and 1.0, incrementing by 0.1. A value of 0 is not used for this attack as it would
correspond to no perturbation budget and thus would result in the same adversarial dataset as
the training set the model has already been evaluated against. The same perturbation budget
range and steps used for the attack were used for generating the security evaluation curve.
SecML’s Attack implementations were run against each entry in the training dataset, giving
us an adversarial example dataset of 500 entries for each perturbation budget (dmax) value.
The model was evaluated against this adversarial dataset and its accuracy recorded for
each perturbation budget value tested. An example of some adversarial examples created with
this technique using the MNIST dataset is shown below in Figure 9 for illustrative purposes.

Figure 9. Adversarial Examples with MNIST dataset. Top row is original image with the “true”
label and the label assigned by the classifier in parenthesis. Bottom row is the same image perturbed via
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PGDLS attack, with the “true” label and the label assigned by the classifier in parenthesis. For
illustrative purposes only. Actual experimental validation was conducted using random x,y-coordinate
pair data.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3-Class Dataset, Best Models
Figure 10, below, shows the accuracy vs perturbation budget plot for the best
performing models of each category (Neural Network and SVM) against the 3-class dataset.
As the SVM with RBF Kernel and the SVM with Polynomial Kernel had the same accuracy
against the test dataset, both models were included, as per the procedure discussed in chapter
3 in the event of a tie. The decision regions of each of the six models along with the table of
results for all models are presented in the 3-class overall results and discussion section of this
chapter.

Figure 10. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 3-class Dataset, Best Models. Note SVM RBF and
SVM Poly curves nearly-perfectly overlap due to identical attack surfaces and performance against
adversarial examples.

As shown in the preceding figure, initial evidence for confirmation of the theory is
mixed, at least when examining the best performing models against this dataset. Though the
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two SVM models had an identical attack surface and identical performance against
adversarial examples, evidence supporting the confirmation of the proposed metric, the
Neural Network model had a higher attack surface value but better performance against
adversarial examples for at least some perturbation budgets, contradicting theory. These
results indicate three possible conclusions: the proposed metric is not valid, the proposed
metric is not valid for comparing different model architectures (e.g., Neural Nets vs SVMs),
or that the metric may not always be valid for comparing different models or model
architectures due to other unknown factors while still being valid for comparisons between
models that share those characteristics. Due to the metric being defined as a loose bound on
performance rather than a precise definition, determining which of these conclusions is
correct is complicated, additional analysis performed by comparing models in the same
architecture as well as the results of the trials against the 6 and 9-class datasets and some
cross-dataset analysis was performed in an attempt to explain results. These additional results
and analysis are contained in the subsequent sections of this chapter, with final conclusions
outlined in Chapter 5. The full table of results for all models, not just those meeting the 0.75
accuracy cutoff, as well as the graph of decision regions and Security Evaluation Curves
(SECs) for all models are contained in the overall results and discussion sections of each
dataset.
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3-Class Dataset, Neural Networks

Figure 11. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 3-class Dataset, Neural Networks. Note, curves almost
perfectly overlap due to very similar attack surface values and performance against adversarial examples.
Only models with an accuracy against the test set >= 0.75 shown.

Figure 11, above, shows the accuracy vs perturbation budget for the two Neural
Network models meeting the 0.75 accuracy cutoff against the test dataset, the model with a
ReLU activation function and the model with a hyperbolic tangent activation function. Both
models had extremely similar, but different, attack surfaces and their performance against
adversarial examples was likewise extremely similar. As the attack surface metric was defined
as a loose bound and the calculated attack surfaces differ only slightly, this behavior supports
a conclusion that the proposed metric is valid in at least some cases. Furthermore, that both
models with different activation functions behave nearly identically implies that the difference
in performance between the Neural Net and SVM models shown in Fig. 10 of the previous
section is likely not anomalous or erroneous but instead indicative of a real difference in
performance not captured by the metric in its currently defined form.
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3-Class Dataset, SVMs

Figure 12. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 3-class Dataset, SVMs. Note, SVM RBF and SVM
Poly curves overlap due to same attack surface and performance against adversarial examples. All three
SVM models shown as all three had accuracy against test dataset >= 0.75.

The data graphed in Figure 12, above, representing the performance of the SVM
models which met the accuracy cutoff, is mixed with regards to confirming the proposed
metric. Both the SVM (RBF) and SVM (Poly) models have the exact same attack surface and
nearly identical performance against adversarial examples which tends to support
confirmation of the metric. The case of the SVM (Linear) model however, muddies the water
somewhat. Though the SVM (Linear) model also degrades quickly under adversarial attack, it
does so less quickly than the other two models, despite its higher attack surface, in contrast to
the prediction of the metric. This is not enough for a wholesale refutation however, as the
nature of the metric as a bound does allow for some instances where a model with a higher
attack surface outperforms one with a lower attack surface, so long as a higher attack surface
performs worse in general.
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3-Class Dataset Overall Results & Findings
This section contains the complete experimental data for all models against the 3-class
dataset in Table 2, below, the classification regions and initial accuracy against the test set for
all six models in Figure 13, below, as well as the SEC curves for all six models in Figure 14,
below, and finally a graph of accuracy vs perturbation budget for all of the models which met
the 0.75 test set accuracy cutoff in Figure 15, below.

Figure 13. Decision Regions, 3-class Dataset, All Models. Model accuracy against test dataset as inset.
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Figure 14. Security Evaluation Curves, 3-class Dataset, All Models. Perturbation budget represented
by x-axis (dmax). Note, y-axis scales may differ between plots.

Table 2. Full Performance Data, 3-class Dataset, All Models.

Model:

Neural Net

Activation

Support Vector Machine

ReLU

Sigmoid

Tanh

Linear

RBF

Polynomial

1.152

2.288

1.104

0.688

0.592

0.592

0

0.856

0.714

0.862

0.914

0.926

0.926

0.1

0.594

0.646

0.588

0.516

0.478

0.478

0.2

0.288

0.448

0.294

0.174

0.066

0.064

0.3

0.032

0.130

0.030

0.0014

0.002

0.002

0.4

0.002

0.008

0.002

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.5

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Function/Kernel:

Perturbation Budget

Attack Surface:
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0.000
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0.000

0.000

0.7

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.8

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.9

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

1.0

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Figure 15. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 3-class Dataset, All Models. Only models with
accuracy against test dataset >= 0.75 shown.

As discussed in the preceding sections, the evidence for either supporting or refuting
the proposed attack surface metric is mixed. Comparing all models which met the 0.75 test set
accuracy against the 3-class dataset only further complicates the picture. Both Neural
Networks have nearly identical attack surfaces and performances, and the SVM (RBF) and
SVM (Poly) models also have identical attack surfaces and nearly identical performances,
though distinct from those of the Neural Networks. The Neural Network models performed
better against adversarial examples, despite having a higher attack surface, with a value
almost twice that of the SVM (RBF) and SVM (Poly) models, yet substantially better
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performance at perturbation budgets of 0.2 and 0.3. The SVM (Linear) performance trend
being almost perfectly between these two extremes does not help clarify matters either. One
category of models consistently outperforming the other despite having a higher attack
surface can imply that there is a difference between various types of model architectures with
regards to how they perform against adversarial examples. If there is such a difference, it
would not refute the validity of the metric as a whole, only indicate there may be certain
constraints on comparing various models with it. The 3-class dataset results do not provide
enough evidence to either confirm or reject the validity of the proposed metric, and results
from the 6-class and 9-class datasets must also be considered in order to reach a conclusion.

6-Class Dataset, Best Models

Figure 16. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 6-class Dataset, Best Models.

Performance against the 6-class dataset for the best models of each category was more
in line with what was expected if the attack surface metric as defined is accurate. The Neural
Net (ReLU) model had an attack surface approximately 60% greater than that of the SVM
(RBF) model, and performed worse against adversarial examples. Notably, the difference in
performance between the two models also cannot be explained solely on the difference in
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their initial accuracy, as the Neural Net (ReLU) model had an initial accuracy against the test
dataset of 0.874 and the SVM (RBF) model had an accuracy of 0.922 for a difference in initial
performance of 4.8% and yet at their widest performance difference at a perturbation budget
of 0.2, the models had accuracies of 0.044 and 0.108, respectively, for a difference of 6.4%,
greater than the difference in initial accuracy between the two. The results of the best models
on the 6-class dataset lend support to confirming the validity of the proposed attack surface
metric.

6-Class Dataset, Neural Networks

Figure 17. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 6-class Dataset, Neural Networks. Only Neural Net
(ReLU) met the accuracy against test dataset >= 0.75 cutoff for inclusion.

As only one Neural Network model, the Neural Net with a ReLU activation function,
met the initial accuracy cutoff of 0.75, its performance cannot be compared against other
Neural Networks for this dataset. No conclusions can be drawn as a result, and this section
and figure have been included for the sake of consistency.
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6-Class Dataset, SVMs

Figure 18. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 6-class Dataset, SVMs. Only models with accuracy
against test dataset >= 0.75 shown.

All three SVM models met the 0.75 accuracy cutoff to be included in this analysis.
Unlike the case with the 3-class SVMs, performance against the 6-class dataset is much more
inline with expectations. The SVM (Linear) model had the highest attack surface and had
performance either slightly worse or slightly better than the SVM (Poly) model which had the
second highest attack surface, while the SVM (RBF) model with the lowest attack surface
performed the best among all three models. These results support confirmation of the
proposed metric.

6-class Dataset, Overall Results & Findings
This section contains the complete experimental data for all models against the 6-class
dataset in Table 3, below, the classification regions and initial accuracy against the test set for
all six models in Figure 19, below, as well as the SEC curves for all six models in Figure 20,
below, and finally a graph of accuracy vs perturbation budget for all of the models which met
the 0.75 test set accuracy cutoff in Figure 21, below.
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Figure 19. Decision Regions, 6-class Dataset, All Models. Model accuracy against test dataset as
inset.

43

Figure 20. Security Evaluation Curves, 6-class Dataset, All Models. Perturbation budget represented
by x-axis (dmax). Note, y-axis scales may differ between plots.

Table 3. Full Performance Data, 6-class Dataset, All Models.

Model:

Neural Net

Activation

Support Vector Machine

ReLU

Sigmoid

Tanh

Linear

RBF

Polynomial

8.064

35.456

43.392

7.680

4.992

5.376

0

0.874

0.446

0.322

0.880

0.922

0.916

0.1

0.386

0.196

0.216

0.408

0.422

0.410

0.2

0.044

0.034

0.076

0.062

0.108

0.054

0.3

0.000

0.000

0.016

0.000

0.006

0.000

Function/Kernel:

Budget

Perturbation

Attack Surface:
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0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.8

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.9

0.000

0.000

0.000
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0.000
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0.000
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Figure 21. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 6-class Dataset, All Models. Only models with
accuracy against test dataset >= 0.75 shown.

Results against the 6-class dataset support validation of the proposed attack surface
metric as valid. The model with the smallest attack surface, SVM (RBF) performed the best
against adversarial examples in all cases. The model with the highest attack surface, Neural
Net (ReLU) performed the worst in all cases. The two models with attack surfaces between
these two extremes, the SVM (Linear) and SVM (Poly) had performance curves firmly
between the two as well. Though at times the SVM (Linear) model slightly outperformed the
SVM (Poly) model this is acceptable as the metric is only intended as a loose bound on attack
surface and the difference in both performance and attack surface is slight.
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9-Class Dataset, Best Models

Figure 22. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 9-class Dataset, Best Models.

Figure 22, above, containing the results of the two best performing models provides
evidence which does not support confirming the proposed metric as valid, at least insofar as
the model with a larger attack surface (Neural Net (ReLU)) outperforms the model with a
lower attack surface (SVM (Poly)) against adversarial examples. The attack surfaces differ
substantially, with the Neural Net (ReLU) model having an attack surface of 97.28 compared
to the SVM (Poly) attack surface of 63.488, a difference of roughly 50%. Though this
difference is substantial, the performance of the two models is still quite close and neither the
gap in performance nor the difference in attack surface is as large as that of the 3-class dataset
where the Neural Net models outperformed two of the SVM models, more than tripling their
performance at a perturbation budget of 0.2 while having double their attack surface value. As
such, if that large a difference is explainable by the metric being a loose bound, then this
difference in performance should also qualify under that explanation. These results provide
weak evidence supporting confirmation of the metric as valid.
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9-Class Dataset, Neural Networks

Figure 23. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 9-class Dataset, Neural Networks. Only models with
accuracy against test dataset >= 0.75 shown.

Performance of the two Neural Network models which met the accuracy cutoff
(Figure 23) is extremely close at all perturbation budgets. This near-identical performance is
in spite of a difference in attack surface between the two models, with the Neural Net (ReLU)
having an attack surface of 97.28 and the Neural Net (Tanh) having an attack surface of
112.64. This attack surface difference is less than that between the two best models shown in
Figure 22, and thus is likely permissible due to the nature of the metric as a loose bound
instead of a strict quantifier. These results provide weak evidence towards confirmation of the
metric.
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9-Class Dataset, SVMs

Figure 24. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 9-class Dataset, SVMs. Only models with accuracy
against test dataset >= 0.75 shown.

Like the Neural Network models (Fig. 23) and the best models (Fig. 22), both of the
SVM models which met the accuracy cutoff of 0.75 have extremely similar performance
against adversarial examples at all perturbation budgets. The SVM (RBF) and SVM (Poly)
models have the smallest difference in attack surface of any pair of models trained against the
9-class dataset, with the SVM (RBF) model having an attack surface of 71.68 and the SVM
(Poly) model having an attack surface of 63.488. As previously discussed, since the attack
surface metric is a loose bound similar performance between models or slight inconsistencies
where a higher attack surface model outperforms one with a lower attack surface may be
permissible. As it is unknown at what point a difference in attack surface should always be
detectable as a difference in performance and that the gap in attack surface between these two
models is the smallest of all sets of models trained on this dataset, like the best model results
and Neural Network model results, the SVM model results also provide weak evidence
supporting confirmation of the metric.
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9-Class Dataset, Overall Results & Findings
This section contains the complete experimental data for all models against the 9-class
dataset in Table 4, below, the classification regions and initial accuracy against the test set for
all six models in Figure 25, below, as well as the SEC curves for all six models in Figure 26,
below, and finally a graph of accuracy vs perturbation budget for all of the models which met
the 0.75 test set accuracy cutoff in Figure 27, below.

Figure 25. Decision Regions, 9-class Dataset, All Models. Model accuracy against test dataset as
inset.
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Figure 26. Security Evaluation Curves, 9-class Dataset, All Models. Perturbation budget represented
by x-axis (dmax). Note, y-axis scales may differ between plots.

Table 4. Full Performance Data, 9-class Dataset, All Models.

Model:

Neural Net

Activation

Support Vector Machine

ReLU

Sigmoid

Tanh

Linear

RBF

Polynomial

97.280

463.872

112.640

136.192

71.680

63.488

0

0.810

0.094

0.780

0.734

0.860

0.876

0.1

0.320

0.094

0.312

0.358

0.290

0.296

0.2

0.048

0.094

0.054

0.072

0.024

0.012

0.3

0.004

0.094

0.000

0.002

0.002

0.000

0.4

0.000

0.094

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.5

0.000

0.094

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Function/Kernel:

Perturbation Budget

Attack Surface:
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0.000
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Figure 27. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, 9-class Dataset, All Models. Only models with
accuracy against test dataset >= 0.75 shown.

Results against the 9-class dataset are mixed but provide weak support for confirming
the proposed attack surface metric as valid. When comparing all four models which met the
accuracy cutoff, this evidence is weaker still, as the model with the best performance against
adversarial examples, the Neural Net (Tanh) was also the model with the highest attack
surface, with a value of 112.64. Additionally, the model with the worst performance was the
SVM (Poly) model with an attack surface of 63.488, the lowest of the group. The difference
in attack surface between the highest and lowest values is slightly less than 100%, roughly the
same difference as in the 3-class dataset all models case. Given that there are now two
instances where a difference of nearly 100% in attack surface has been calculated but where
the model with higher attack surface outperformed that with the lower attack surface it is
necessary to determine at what point, if any, a difference in attack surface always correlates to
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a difference in performance against adversarial examples. If there is such a point, it will
support validation of the metric as valid, if such a point cannot be found however, it will
support rejecting the proposed metric. In an effort to discover how large a difference in attack
surface is needed to see a corresponding effect in performance, I decided to compare each
group of models across datasets, all Neural Networks across the 3, 6, and 9-class datasets
which met the accuracy cutoff and all SVMs across the three datasets which also met the
cutoff. This allowed me to compare models which were largely similar, differing only in their
hyperparameters, decision functions/weights, and output classes while being otherwise
equivalent but with a difference in attack surface values of several orders of magnitude while
still having an acceptable level of accuracy.

Cross-Dataset, Neural Networks

Figure 28. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, Cross-Dataset, Neural Networks. Only models with
accuracy against test dataset >= 0.75 included. 3-class dataset models have circle markers, 6-class
dataset model has square marker, 9-class dataset models have triangle markers.
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Evidence from the cross-dataset comparison of qualifying Neural Network models
supports confirmation of the metric as valid. Attack surface measurements varied by several
orders of magnitude between models trained on different datasets, and the models trained
against the 3-class dataset which had the smallest attack surface value outperformed all other
models against adversarial examples. Likewise, the models trained against the 9-class dataset
which had the largest attack surfaces performed the worst against adversarial examples. The
lone qualifying model against the 6-class dataset performed better than the highest attack
surface models at a perturbation budget of 0.1, but performed about the same at a perturbation
budget of 0.2, thus while its performance is eventually equivalent to a higher attack surface
model it does outperform it in general.

Cross-Dataset, SVMs

Figure 29. Accuracy vs Perturbation Budget, Cross-Dataset, SVMs. Only models with accuracy
against test dataset >= 0.75 included. 3-class dataset models have circle markers, 6-class dataset model
has square marker, 9-class dataset models have triangle
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Comparing the qualifying SVM models across all three datasets in Figure 29, above,
the results also support confirmation of the metric as valid. The three models with the lowest
attack surfaces, the SVM (Linear), SVM (RBF), and SVM (Poly) trained against the 3-class
dataset outperform all other SVM models with higher attack surfaces in general, with the
SVM (Linear) outperforming all other models in every case, and the other two models
outperforming all others in every case except for the SVM (RBF) model trained on the 6-class
dataset at a perturbation budget of 0.2 though still outperforming it in general. The SVM
(Poly) model trained on the 6-class dataset performed worse against adversarial examples
than all of the models with lower attack surfaces, as did the two SVM models trained on the
9-class dataset which had the highest attack surface of all the SVM models examined.

54

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions
Overall, experimental results support the limited confirmation of the proposed metric
as a valid measurement of an attack surface against adversarial examples. This confirmation
comes with several important caveats, however.
Firstly, this validation was extremely narrow in scope, focusing on only six models
against a single attack type and three datasets. Thus, this validation is very limited in scope,
and it cannot be said to be a complete validation of the proposed metric for the general case.
Being constrained to a single attack type and a limited selection of models are the two greatest
shortcomings of this research, had a wider attack selection and more models been usable a
much broader analysis of the proposed metric could have been conducted which may have
yielded a broader confirmation or the discovery of cases for which it is not valid. This
validation also considered only models which met a defined accuracy cutoff against the test
dataset, it is unknown if the metric remains accurate for models below this cutoff.
Secondly, the metric as defined functions only as a loose bound and thus a difference
in attack surface does not always have a corresponding difference in performance against
adversarial examples. The experimental results obtained indicated that such a difference
becomes noticeable in general only with at least one order of magnitude in attack surface,
limiting its usefulness for comparing models with similar attack surfaces. A requirement for a
difference of several orders of magnitude before an apparent effect hinders the usability of the
metric for practical purposes, as for any data more than trivially complex the attack surface
values will quickly become unwieldy. Identifying additional parameters which contribute to a
model’s attack surface may allow the attack surface definition to become more precise and
thus more accurately describe model performance against adversarial examples.
Furthermore, results against the 3-class dataset show that the metric may not be usable
to compare models to other models which are substantially different, i.e., comparing SVMs to
Neural Networks, based on their attack surface, at least in some cases. While these results
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may be acceptable given the bound nature of the metric they may also hint at scenarios where
the metric is invalid, at least between types of models with certain features. It is interesting to
note that against the 3-class dataset the SVM (Linear) and Neural Network models
substantially outperformed the SVM (RBF) and SVM (Kernel) models despite having higher
attack surfaces, as a Linear SVM and Neural Networks are both examples of parametric
models whereas SVM (RBF) and SVM (Kernel) are non-parametric. This may imply that the
metric should not be used to compare parametric and non-parametric models in certain
instances while still being generally valid for comparing parametric to parametric and nonparametric to non-parametric. However, this experiment did not yield enough evidence to
determine if this was an observed phenomenon or simply normal, if somewhat unusual,
results that arose because the proposed metric is only a loose bound on attack surface instead
of being a precise definition as this behavior was only observed with the 3-class dataset and
did not repeat in either the 6 or 9-class dataset.
In conclusion, though the metric as validated is of limited practical use in the current
form, the experimental data gathered does show strong evidence that model state space and
accuracy are important components for determining a model’s performance under adversarial
example attack. These two factors will likely be included in any future attack surface metrics,
whether an expanded or updated version of the metric proposed herein or one formulated
elsewhere. Lessons learned and areas for future work are discussed in the following sections.

Lessons Learned
Several important lessons were learned through this dissertation, such as how to
operate around unforeseen constraints as happened with the functionality of the SecML
library differing significantly from what was initially promised in the documentation. A lack
of alternatives and insufficient knowledge and resources to either develop an alternative
framework or extend SecML manually required adapting the experimental design to work
with the tools on hand. In the end, a limited validation was performed, and while perhaps not
to the fullest extent originally desired, a limited validation remains significantly better than no
validation at all. While there are several excellent libraries dedicated to machine learning, the
libraries focusing around adversarial examples are significantly more limited, in particular in
their ability to rapidly generate large datasets of adversarial examples instead of a single
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example at a time. The lack of standardization of programming practices and astonishing
dearth of documentation and examples represent a significant hurdle to using these resources
when new to the field and attempting to begin a research program. The lack of standardization
and documentation further hampers any ability for others to contribute to these libraries,
which are often open source, due to the significant start-up cost of pairing specialized
programming skills with a highly technical field which is only a subset of machine learning as
a whole and often receives significantly less attention than other machine learning disciplines.
The lack of available, easy-to-use, well-documented, and scalable adversarial machine
learning tools and libraries represents a significant hurdle to future research in this field which
requires the generation and manipulation of multiple models and large adversarial example
datasets.
Another important lesson learned was the realization that just because a metric may be
accurate or functional does not inherently make it useful or valuable. Though the metric
appears to be valid under the constraints used in the experiment, the values generated by the
formula for attack surface calculation can quickly blow up into enormous values which are far
too impractical for everyday use. This means that even if the metric as currently defined were
validated across enough cases to be considered valid in general that it would still be of limited
value and likely see little use in a practical setting outside of possible research use. On the
other hand, just because the metric as currently defined may be of limited practical use does
not make it worthless. Potential reformulations or future work, discussed in the next section,
may allow it to be more practically useful if it can be verified across a wider number of cases.
Even should such future reformulations still render the metric largely unsuitable for practical
use, the experimental data showed that state space and accuracy are two important
components of any future definitions of an attack surface, allowing future work to build upon
these results to perhaps create a more accurate or useful definition.

Areas for Future Work
There is ample ground for future work building upon what was done here in this
dissertation. Most pressing is a need to expand the validation to cover additional models and
datasets as well as significantly expand the number of attacks used to generate adversarial
examples. The very limited nature of this validation is the single biggest shortcoming of this

57
research, as the conclusions reached are necessarily limited to a very narrow subset of the
enormous landscape that is machine learning research. Expanding the validation of this metric
to include additional models, attacks, and data types will increase the level of confidence that
the conclusions reached in this dissertation are valid across all models, attacks, and data types,
or discover instances in which this metric is not valid. Such expansion may also shed light on
whether an initial accuracy boundary exists below which the metric is no longer a valid
descriptor of model behavior and may illuminate the precise nature of the relationship
between attack surface and performance against adversarial examples. Of particular interest
would be results showing whether or not a single attack surface value against all attacks or a
modified attack surface value against individual attacks is more appropriate for a given
model.
The second most pressing area for future work is further research into the precise
relationship between the attack surface and a model’s performance against adversarial
examples. Experimental data gathered in this dissertation does not show a clear linear
relationship, models with one or more orders of magnitude of difference in their attack
surfaces still perform similarly in some situations, and the metric seems to only describe a
very general trend in its current form. Additional research in this area could reveal what form
this relationship takes, likely some form of logarithmic, or perhaps log(log(x)), or being based
on the area under the robustness curve, though this remains pure speculation without
additional data which is outside the scope of this dissertation and thus not mentioned in the
conclusions. Said future work may also reveal that there is, in fact, no relationship between
changes in attack surface and vulnerability to adversarial examples and that the results
obtained, and conclusions reached in this dissertation are a false positive signal. This
possibility seems less likely, given the strong general agreement across multiple models and
datasets for the given attack type demonstrated in this dissertation, though the possibility
cannot be conclusively ruled out without additional work. Revealing that there is not a
precise, predictable relationship between a change in attack surface and a model’s
performance but rather only a very general relationship would also be useful both for use in
future research in this area as well as when analyzing the defensive properties of models.
Finally, exploration of a reformulation or expansion of the attack surface metric
should be explored. The metric as currently defined does not generate attack surface values
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that are inherently useful, as translating these values into specific predictions about model
behavior is impossible without more data on the relationship between attack surface and
performance, and values against real-world datasets can quickly blow up to become unwieldy.
Additionally, as currently defined the metric considers only two factors for determining an
attack surface and it is likely that there are additional factors which play a role in determining
model attack surface, alternative formulations of the attack surface to include additional
model characteristics may result in a more accurate measurement of the attack surface.
Alternative formulations or normalization of the values generated may also yield values
which are more practically usable, enabling adoption and use of the attack surface metric in
areas outside of academic research for which security against adversarial examples is a critical
concern. These items are listed as least pressing not because they are not pressing issues and
ripe for follow-up, they are, but rather because expanding the validation of the metric and
exploring the nature of the relationship between attack surface and vulnerability may naturally
yield to alternative, more accurate formulations of this metric, and developing alternative
formulations before those issues are addressed may result in them being rendered invalid by
future work in those areas.
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